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1. Introduction 
Subsidies are one of the ways through which the 
company can fund its investment activities when its 
own resources are not sufficient. Tokila et al. (2008) 
define public business subsidies as a form of financial 
support given by the state to private sector firms either 
directly or through intermediary organisations. 
Other financial instruments include bank loans or 
leases. All of these have their pros and cons. To 
prevent the situation where the outcomes of the 
investment project are different from that expected, 
this article aims to identify the facts that can lower the 
available amount of received financial support. 
The importance of investment for economic 
growth is obvious. [It] contributes greatly to ensuring 
a normal development of an economy [and is] the key 
factor in the development of production infrastructure 
and the material basis for all the socio-cultural 
activities undertaken, as well as a boost in the quality 
of life in any kind of economy (Zirra, 2011). Invest-
ments in agriculture represent the material support of 
social and economic development of rural space. 
Through them is ensured the fixed capital enhance, the 
increase of economic and technical efficiency of 
existent ones, the creation of new labor places and the 
raise of the labor productivity (Timofti and Memeţ, 
2012).  
The Czech lands were already a heavily industrial-
ized and agricultural region back when they were still 
part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the level of 
concentration and mechanization of agricultural 
production in the Czech lands was among the highest 
in the Empire (Grešlová Kušková, 2013). However, 
during the era of communism, the situation changed. 
As Lerman et al. (2004) find, [s]ocialized farms 
appear to have been undermechanized despite the 
persistent mechanization efforts in all socialist coun-
tries that resulted in large machinery parks in abso-
lute numbers. However, there was a sharp mechaniza-
tion gap between socialist and market economies in 
terms of the ratio of machinery to labor (Lerman et 
al., 2004). The financial performance of agricultural 
holdings thus did not allow much investment into the 
replacement of assets. 
After the revolution in 1989, Czech agriculture 
was undercapitalised. At the outset of transition, there 
was a substantial need for restructuring – mainly 
a modification of firms’ structures in terms of organi-
zational form, size, and quality of inputs used – and 
a reallocation of resources towards more efficient 
uses, which triggered reforms such as privatization, 
institutional changes, and policy liberalization 
(Bojnec and Latruffe, 2011). Agricultural holdings 
needed to implement large investments to be able to 
expand their size and implement modern technology 
(Bojnec and Latruffe, 2011). 
Nowadays, the situation is still not positive. As 
stated in the Vision of Czech Agriculture document 
after 2010 (Ministry of Agriculture, 2010), there is 
still a problem of undercapitalisation and credit 
burden. The analysis of gross fixed capital formation, 
consumption of fixed capital and rate of investment 
burden performed by Řezbová et al. (2009) in the 
Czech Republic showed that in the period 2000–2003 
there was not even simple replacement of assets in the 
value of write-offs (consumption of fixed capital) in 
agriculture, and the situation was balanced only in 
2004, in the period 2005–2008 the annual balance 
was positive. Only since 2004 has agriculture begun 
a positive trend in investment activity. This increase 
was caused mainly by the usage of support pro-
grammes to encourage investment in agriculture that 
became available after the entrance of the Czech 
Republic into the European Union (EU). 
Many authors are concerned about the impact of 
the EU’s subsidies; however, few have studied the 
influence on microeconomic-level agricultural hold-
ings. This article therefore simulates the effects of 
investment funding by subsidies in comparison with 
other possibilities. Firstly, the theoretical grounding 
for the funding of fixed assets is presented. Then, the 
approach towards the analysis is introduced. The 
following chapter sets the conditions for the conse-
quent simulations, which are carried out in computa-
tional tables. The obtained results are discussed next. 
Finally, the conclusions are drawn in the last chapter. 
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2. Funding fixed assets: theoretical grounding 
One of the important sources of financial means after 
the entrance into the EU is the European Agricultural 
Fund for Rural Development in the case of agriculture. 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), an instru-
ment for achieving set goals in agriculture, is divided 
into two pillars. While the first one includes direct aid 
and market measures as well as the payments to be 
claimed, the second pillar represents mostly project-
based subsidies where it is not granted that the entre-
preneur receives the subsidy. Currently, the Rural 
Development Programme (RDP) is valid in the Czech 
Republic. This is divided into four axes and technical 
support. 
Within the programmes of axis I, companies can 
apply for investment support. Under the measure I.1.1. 
Modernisation of farms, it is possible to buy tangible 
fixed assets or to build, rebuild or reconstruct agricul-
tural households, buildings, technologies and so on. 
The investment project must be submitted together 
with the application. The level of co-funding varies 
from 40% to 60%. Young farmers and farmers farm-
ing in less favourable areas (LFAs) can profit from 
a higher percentage. The amount of expenditure on 
which the subsidy per project is calculated varies from 
100 thousand CZK to 30 million CZK (included). The 
maximum amount of subsidies per applicant is 90 mil. 
CZK in the period of 2007–2013 (Ministry of Agricul-
ture, 2011). The contribution of the EU is 75% of 
public resources; the rest of the financial means comes 
from the Czech Republic’s budget. 
The projects under measure I.1.1.1 Modernisation 
of agricultural holdings include construction and 
technologies for either livestock production or crop 
production. Other eligible costs consist of expenditure 
on technical and project documentation, VAT (if the 
farm is not a VAT-registered company) and, in specif-
ic cases, the purchase of the building, too. 
2.1 Ways of funding fixed assets 
There are generally three types of methods for how the 
fixed assets of agricultural holdings can be funded: 
subsidies, bank loans and leases. 
The sources of input subsidies are diverse. Differ-
ent levels of government (central, state, and local) can 
provide direct financial support to input industries, 
parastatal and private input traders, and farmers. The 
government can also design policies that subsidize 
inputs indirectly, such as those related to trade and 
marketing. Subsidies can be disaggregated further 
into those for fertilizer, credit, irrigation, and power 
(Fan and Gulati, 2007). According to the purpose, we 
distinguish two types of subsidies: operational and 
investment. They have different impacts on the func-
tioning of the company. 
Bojnec and Latruffe’s (2011) analysis of the finan-
cial determinants of investment decisions made by 
Slovenian family farms during the transition to 
a market economy in the period 1994–2003 showed 
the non-significant impact of investment subsidies 
received by farms, but a positive impact of operational 
subsidies for small farms only, on the alleviation of 
financial constraints (Bojnec and Latruffe, 2011). 
Concerning the Czech situation, according to 
Rosochatecká (2005), the investment subsidies from 
the operational programme Rural Development and 
Multifunctional Agriculture have had a positive 
impact on agricultural holdings. In addition, the 
[n]on-investment supports in the framework of Hori-
zontal Rural Development Programmed in the form of 
LFA payments (support of less favorable areas and 
areas with environmental constraints) and agrienvi-
ronmental measures in the total amount of 4.03 mld. 
CZK positively influenced financial stability of entre-
preneurships in less favorable production conditions 
(Rosochatecká, 2005). 
According to Danielova and Sarkar (2011), most 
firms use debt funding in real life. Projects are usually 
partly funded with equity and partly with debt. The 
obvious disadvantage of loan funding is the reward 
required in the form of interest and in the case of 
financial leases in the form of lease coefficients. 
(Operating leases are not taken into account in the 
article as the company is not becoming the owner of 
the object of the lease. This type of lease is also not 
eligible for a subsidy.) In general, it is administrative-
ly more demanding to receive a loan than a lease. 
Loans for farmers are usually more expensive than 
those for other companies due to the higher risks in 
agriculture than in industry. Among the advantages of 
loan capital usage when funding fixed assets is that 
debt funding enables tax leverage. It is possible to 
deduct loan interest from the costs. The tax base is 
therefore lower compared with the same tax liability. 
On the other hand, in the case of financial leases, the 
company becomes the owner of the fixed assets only 
after it pays off all the lease instalments and therefore 
cannot apply write-offs. It is not possible to subtract 
the interest from the costs, only the lease instalments. 
In comparison with other types of fixed asset fund-
ing (loans or leases), subsidies have specific ad-
vantages. The first benefit is that they are usually 
provided in irretrievable form. The entrepreneur is not 
obliged to pay regular payments, which would burden 
his or her cash flow. However, obtaining a subsidy for 
tangible fixed assets has the indirect effect of increas-
ing income tax. It causes the reduction in the acquisi-
tion price of the assets for write-off. A lower amount 
of write-off as a cost item increases the tax obligation. 
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Subsidies projects are in most cases mandatorily 
pre-funded, i.e. the receiver has to firstly cover all 
expenditure and the eligible costs are repaid after-
wards. The investment project also has to be co-
funded by the company to prevent the crowding-out 
effect of public finances devoted to investment pro-
jects. They should only complement the private 
resources. In the worst case, investment assistance 
entirely substitutes for private funds and generates no 
increase in the scale of investment and thus implies an 
arbitrary transfer of resources from tax payer to 
producer (Wren 1996 in Tokila et al., 2008). 
 The need to pre-fund project expenses exposes the 
farm to the risky situation that the expenditure will not 
be repaid for various reasons on both sides. For 
example, this could include the company’s inability to 
fulfil the project criteria or incapability of the public 
administration to pay the support. On the farm’s side, 
there could be deficiencies in the registration of all 
documents in accounting, activation of the documents 
and lack of control in high risk actions (Simionescu et 
al., 2009). From the position of the public administra-
tion, there is a danger of legislative changes. However, 
this is minimised by the fact that the programming 
period in the EU is seven years and that new pro-
grammes are usually linked to previous ones. 
Simionescu et al. (2009) identify three major risks 
related to projects with European funding: (1) the risk 
of lacking the technical capacity to elaborate eligible 
projects; (2) the risk of lacking co-financing funds; (3) 
the risk of lacking institutional capacity to step 
through the entire path from the moment of submitting 
the project until accomplishing the implementation 
respecting the terms imposed by the European Union. 
Some firms can suffer from a lack of access to the 
private finances needed to pre-fund or co-fund pro-
jects. Tokila et al. (2008) suggest that this may occur 
due to the failure of information, public goods, incom-
plete markets, externalities, competition and macroe-
conomic disturbances. The possibility of gaining 
investment finances also depends on the features of 
the company – on its size, age and location – and on 
the characteristics of the particular project that the 
firm desires to implement. The better the firm’s 
investment-bearing capacity is, the less likely the firm 
is to need public assistance; for example, it is likely to 
be able to manage the risks involved in the investment 
project better and to have access to private funds 
(Tokila et al., 2008). The firm’s investment-bearing 
capacity is positively related to the size of the firm and 
negatively to the size of the project. 
Many applicants find it difficult to prepare the ap-
plication for a subsidy or write it correctly because of 
the deficiencies in organising procedures, a lack of 
precise responsibilities, insufficient human resources 
or old/unsatisfactory documentation. Therefore, some 
firms need the assistance of an advisory company, 
which raises transaction costs and lowers the total 
benefit of the subsidy. The supported investments are 
also the subject of controls from the responsible 
bodies and, if deficiencies are found, the funds do not 
have to be granted in full or can be withdrawn. 
There is also moral risk related to the usage of sub-
sidies. The fact that the company does not fund the 
projects exclusively by its own equity can lead to 
riskier behaviour. There is also the increased possibil-
ity that projects with higher risk (which may result to 
financial losses for the company) will be implemented 
and will not be successful or that unnecessary invest-
ments will be made. 
2.2 The impact of investment subsidies 
Usually, the impacts of subsidy measures devoted to 
funding investments on economic indicators are 
analysed. For example, Lahiri (2012) assesses the 
impact of the provision of an investment subsidy on 
the output and employment levels in industrial and 
agricultural sectors in India. The impact of investment 
subsidies on overall welfare is evaluated by Gravelle 
(2010): [М]оdelling the effect of investment subsidies, 
whether granted via rate reductions or investment 
subsidies, suggests that little gain in long-run welfare 
can be expected. 
One of the fields of study is the deadweight of the 
projects, as some of them might not have been imple-
mented if they were not funded from the EU’s funds. 
Deadweight is the degree to which projects would 
have been carried out without grant assistance (Tokila 
et al., 2008). Tokila et al. (2008) perform the ex-ante 
analysis of the deadweight of investment projects in 
Finland. Their paper assesses the profile of subsidised 
zero deadweight investment projects – projects that 
would be abandoned without public subsidies and 
finds that there is a higher degree of deadweight for 
bigger companies, as they are likely to have access to 
other sources of funding such as bank loans and 
requited forms of public support (European Commis-
sion, 1997). 
Another area of research is the evaluation of the 
impact directly on the receiving firm. The influence of 
subsidies on the cash flow of the firm is studied by 
Pšenčík et al. (2010). According to their methodology, 
it is possible to analyse the impact of receiving the 
support on the firm’s cash flow when that flow is seen 
as the opposite of the flow from the subsidy provider. 
Zirra et al. (2011) study the impact of subsidised 
projects on company sales. They prove, by using an 
econometric model, that there is a positive and statisti-
cally significant association between the farms’ gross 
investment decisions and growth in real sales. The 
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findings of Bojnec and Latruffe (2011) show that 
providing cash subsidies to firms or farms may help to 
enhance investment, particularly during an economic 
and financial crisis or necessary restructuring for 
emerging market economies. 
According to Kula et al. (2011), each company 
should take into account all possible impacts of 
a subsidized project. Contrary to that, some possible 
impacts are not evident or clear. To prevent the 
situation where the outcomes of the investment project 
are different from those expected, this article aims to 
identify the facts that can lower the actual amount of 
the received subsidy. The investment decision making 
of the agricultural holding is considered. The simula-
tion of three ways of investment funding is performed 
and pursuant to the analysis, the conclusion of the 
most appropriate funding method is made. 
3. Methodology 
The paper shows the effect of a subsidised project on 
the performance of an agricultural holding if its 
investment activities are funded within the measure of 
axis I of the RDP implemented in the Czech Republic 
in the frame of the CAP of the EU in the period of 
2007–2013. We select a measure of restructuring and 
developing physical capital and innovation support, 
particularly on the priority I.1 Modernisation, innova-
tion and quality, measures of the I.1.1 Modernisation 
of agricultural holdings and sub-measures of the 
I.1.1.1 Modernisation of agricultural holdings. 
Funding costs by using subsidies (the share of 
funding the costs of the investment project by using 
subsidies relative to the total granted subsidies) are 
compared with the costs of other ways of funding 
tangible assets. The aim is to assess the best way of 
purchasing investments in the agricultural holdings 
sector. The indicator calculated is the share of funding 
costs relative to the total value of the project. The 
table created in MS Excel enables us to change partic-
ular variables and simulate different situations (the 
value of the project, the height of the subsidy, the type 
of beneficiary etc.). 
The official documents issued by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and State’s agricultural interventional 
funds (SAIF) and the implementation manual are used 
to simulate the situation realistically. The data are 
obtained from the ARAD database of the Czech 
national bank and from the SAIF webpages, where the 
lists of accepted application for subsidies are pub-
lished. 
4. Analysis and results 
The impact of the project funded from the EU’s fund 
under the measure I.1.1.1 Modernisation of the farms 
is examined. In the framework of this measure, it was 
possible to submit applications in five rounds of calls: 
first, third, sixth, ninth and thirteenth. An application 
for a subsidy is submitted to the SAIF, which then 
gathers applications, gives points to them, recom-
mends them to realisation and publishes the results on 
its website. The selection criteria and points that they 
are awarded are publically accessible. From the 
amount of points that each project gained, however, it 
is not possible to assess project quality, as it does not 
include indicators of the firm’s financial situation.  
4.1 Funding by subsidies 
The value of one project varied from 38 669 CZK to 
18 mil. CZK during all rounds of calls for applica-
tions. Most projects were realised under measure a): 
construction and technologies for livestock produc-
tion. An average project in livestock production 
(measure a)) was more expensive (2.934 mil. CZK) 
than an average project in crop production (measure 
b)), where it was only 2.54 mil. CZK. Therefore, for 
the simulation, I take a project worth 2.7 mil. CZK.  
The majority of projects among all rounds focused 
on building, constructions and reconstructions, re-
building, repairs and renewals. The construction of 
new buildings was the aim in fewer projects. Howev-
er, in the last round, under the measure focused on 
crop production, it was the highest. The replacement 
of or change to technologies followed. The minority of 
projects concentrated on completion, extension and 
expansion. I took the most common project and 
considered the constructing of the building in the 
simulation. 
According to the farmer and land category, there 
are four levels of co-funding from the EU’s fund. In 
the first case, I analysed the situation of  other farmers 
not farming in LFAs. Therefore, the amount of the 
subsidy was 1.08 mil. CZK (40% of the costs of the 
project). The purchase of a fixed asset that belongs to 
the third write-off group (with a write-off period of 10 
years) is considered. 
4.2 Lost tax lowering thanks to write-off 
Accepting an investment subsidy for the purchase of 
tangible or intangible fixed assets lowers the value of 
the amount of the subsidy given for the purchase of 
the assets. Eligible investment expenditure for subsi-
dies must be tangible and intangible property, defined 
according the 26 and 32 a) Act No. 586/1992, about 
income taxes. This includes separate movable things 
whose entrance price is higher than 40 thousand CZK 
and function for longer than one year, buildings, 
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constructions, permanent ground cover and projects 
and programme equipment with an entrance price 
higher than 60 thousand CZK (utilisation longer than 
one year). 
The entrance value for write-off is therefore only 
1.62 mil. CZK. The opportunity costs consist of the 
tax lowering, which could have been achieved if the 
project was not subsidised. Lost tax lowering is 
discounted according to the years of the usage of the 
investment (205 200 CZK in this case). As a discount 
rate, the two-week REPO rate or the firm’s own 
designed rate can be used. Another possibility is to 
calculate the geometrical average of the five-year state 
bond interest during a specific time period (2.09% for 
the first half of 2012). In this case, total opportunity 
costs amounted to 165 400 CZK. 
4.3 Loan for pre-funding 
The agricultural holding needs to co-fund the project; 
therefore, I suppose that it already had equity for 
funding part of the project. However, the subsidised 
project also has to be pre-funded. In order to do so, the 
firm takes out a loan with an interest rate that is 
calculated as the geometric mean of the interest rates 
of the loans granted to non-financial companies 
(4.84% for the period of January to June 2012). The 
required amount could be borrowed once or twice. In 
the first case, the interest would be 52 290 CZK and 
the tax saving 9 930 CZK, while in the second case 
the interest would be only 39 220 CZK and tax saving 
7 540 CZK. The net costs of the loan are then 42 350 
CZK and 31 760 CZK, respectively. 
4.4 Administration costs 
Other expenditure that the firm must take into account 
includes the administration costs for submitting the 
application and for a tender in the appropriate cases. 
The preparation of the application for the subsidy and 
the realisation of the project can be done either by the 
agricultural holding itself or by the consulting agency. 
The latter minimises the risk of the loss of subsidies in 
the case of administrative deficiencies (there are 
stricter requirements for the documentation and 
monitoring of projects when they are funded from 
public resources). Research on companies providing 
consulting services in the area of subsidy applications 
shows that the preparation of the application starts on 
14 000 CZK without VAT depending on the total 
value of project. The monitoring during building, 
participation on the control days and so on costs 
around 16 000 CZK and finalising the project includ-
ing the final report costs from 11 000 CZK more. 
If the expected value of the contract is over 
500 000 CZK (excluding VAT), the appli-
cant/beneficiary must hold the appropriately docu-
mented tender. Selected suppliers have to come from 
at least three received offers. According to Kula et al. 
(2011), the costs of a tender can be around 100 000 
CZK. In the case of sublimit open tenders or simpli-
fied tenders, the costs are lower; according to the 
expert estimate, these are between 35 000 CZK and 
75 000 CZK without VAT (tender documentation 
included). In the case of small-scale public tenders, 
the costs could be around 15 000 CZK without VAT. 
Because the sample projects amount to 2.7 mil. CZK, 
the higher price for tender administration (70 000 
CZK without VAT) is taken into account. 
The expenditure for application submission and 
tender administration is spent in preparatory year –1, 
the project monitoring expenditure during year 0 and 
the finalising expenditure at the end of year 0. The 
repayment of the eligible costs is set at the beginning 
of year 1; therefore, the costs include the accrual of 
interest. (If the farm did not incur administrative costs, 
it could have paid the money into the bank and gained 
interest.) The application and tender expenditure is 
compound interested for two years, monitoring costs 
for 0.5 year and finalising costs do not change as they 
are spent at the beginning of year 1, when the project 
starts to function. 
4.5 Results of the simulation 
To recalculate the project, all calculations were carried 
out in MS Excel using a form (see appendix – Table 
1). The grey cells mark the variables that can be 
changed and the whole example is recalculated auto-
matically afterwards. 
Table 1 Projects funded with subsidies in the case of older 
farmers farming in non-LFAs (mil. CZK) 
Total cost of the project 2 700 
Amount of subsidy 1 080 
Years of write-off 10 
Lost tax lowering after discount 165.40  
Net costs of the loan 42.35 31.76 
Administrative costs 115.76  
Additional costs of the subsidy 323.52 312.93 
Share of the additional costs 
relative to total project costs 11.98% 11.59% 
Adjusted amount of subsidy 756.48 767.07 
Share of the additional costs 
relative to the amount of subsidy 29.96% 28.97% 
The total amount of granted subsidy is lowered by 
the amount of additional costs related to the fact that 
the project was funded by a subsidy. The total addi-
tional costs could reach 323 520 CZK if the loan for 
refunding was taken at once. If it was taken in two 
parts, the additional costs would be 312 930 CZK. The 
subsidy was instead of 1 080 000 CZK only 756 480 
CZK or 767 070 CZK, respectively. The share of 
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additional costs relative to total project costs is 
11.98% (11.59%), which is a relatively high amount 
of lost finances. These additional costs represent 
almost 30% of the subsidies. The summary of the 
example can be found in Table 1. 
4.6 Other simulations 
The simulated example was recalculated for the 
situation of young farmers farming in LFAs. In this 
case, a higher amount of support is received (60% of 
project costs). This time, the subsidy is 1.62 mil CZK. 
All other conditions remain the same. Because the 
amount of received support is higher, the ratio of 
additional costs to the subsidies increases. The share 
of the additional costs relative to total project costs is 
around 15%. This is 3.85 percentage points (p. ps) 
higher (when the loan is taken at once) or 3.65 p. ps 
higher (when the loan is taken in two parts) than in the 
case of older farmers in non-LFAs. The results of the 
project are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Projects funded with subsidies in the case of young 
farmers farming in LFAs (mil. CZK) 
Total cost of the project 2 700 
Amount of subsidy 1 620 
Years of write-off 10 
Lost tax lowering after discount 248.10 
Net costs of the loan 63.53 47.65 
Administrative costs 115.76 
Additional costs of the subsidy 427.39 411.51 
Share of the additional costs 
relative to total project costs 15.83 % 15.24 % 
Adjusted amount of subsidy 1 192.61 1 208.49 
Share of the additional costs 
relative to the amount of subsidy 26.38 % 25.40 % 
It was expected that a higher subsidy would in-
crease the opportunity costs (lost tax lowering). The 
farmer is somehow punished for the fact that he or she 
receives a higher percentage of subsidy in the form of 
higher costs related to the administration of the finan-
cial support. On the other hand, it is obvious that the 
share of the additional costs relative to the amount of 
subsidy will be lower – by 3.57 p. ps in this case. This 
is disproportionate: when the costs rise by 3.85 p. ps, 
the share decreases only by 3.57 p. ps. 
If the farmer is either young in non-LFAs or older 
in LFAs, he or she receives a 50% subsidy. The results 
are in the middle of the previous extreme categories of 
farmers as can be seen in Table 3.  
 
 
Table 3 Projects funded with subsidies in the case of young 
farmers farming in non-LFAs or older farmers farming in 
LFAs (mil. CZK) 
Total cost of the project 2 700  
Amount of subsidy  1 350  
Years of write-off 10  
Lost tax lowering after discount 206.75  
Net costs of the loan  52.94 39.71 
Administrative costs  115.76  
Additional costs of the subsidy 375.45 362.22 
Share of the additional costs relative to 
total project costs 13.91 % 13.42 %
Adjusted amount of subsidy 974.55 987.78 
Share of the additional costs relative to 
the amount of subsidy 27.81 % 26.83 %
4.7 Funding by bank loans 
If the same project was funded only by a bank loan at 
the same interest rate as in previous calculations 
(4.84%), the farmer would have to pay back 2.7 mil. 
CZK increasing by interest. The share of loan costs 
relative to the total price of the investment is compa-
rable with the subsidised project only if the loan is 
repaid within three to four years. Otherwise, the costs 
would be significantly higher. If the loan is paid back 
after one year, the share of the interests  on the amount 
borrowed is only 3.92%, but with a three-year pay-
back period, the share is already 12.34% and for a 10-
year loan, it reaches almost 50%. The results are 
displayed in Table 4. 
Table 4 The costs of the loan in relation to the borrowed 
amount (the price of the project) 
Duration Interests Tax save Net costs of the loan Share 
1 year 130.72 24.84 105.88 3.92 % 
3 years 411.45 78.17 333.27 12.34 % 
4 years 562.08 106.80 455.29 16.86 % 
5 years 720.01 136.80 583.21 21.60 % 
7 years 1 059.18 201.24 857.94 31.78 % 
10 years 1 632.04 310.09 1 321.95 48.96 % 
4.8 Funding by leases 
Considering the lease to be a fixed asset funding 
option, I simulated the situation with a downpayment 
of 30% (810 000 CZK) and an effective interest rate 
of 10%. The lease payments are therefore 
60 985 CZK. The share of the costs for the lease 
relative to the borrowed amount would be 11.31% 
when the lease is paid back in three years. Compared 
with the subsidies and three-year bank loan option, the 
share is the lowest. However, if the payback period is 
four years, the share increases to 15.22%. This is 
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higher than in the case of the subsidies (with the 
exception of young farmers in LFAs), but still lower 
than in the four-year bank loan option. 
5. Discussion 
The performed simulations show that according to our 
expectations, the share of costs relative to total project 
costs is the highest in the case of long-term bank 
loans. However, surprisingly, the three- and four-year 
bank loan option is more costly than the lease with 
a similar payback period. The share of additional costs 
relative to total project costs in the case of subsidy 
funding is also contrary to our assumptions. If the 
farmer is young and is farming in LFAs, he or she is 
supported by a higher percentage of subsidy. Paradox-
ically, the additional costs spent due to receiving the 
subsidy are higher than in the case of older farmers in 
non-LFAs by almost 2 p. ps. These additional costs 
consist of opportunity and administrative costs. 
Therefore, the higher is the amount of the subsidy, the 
higher is the share of these costs related to obtaining 
the subsidy relative to total project costs, which is in 
contrast to the original idea of supporting more disad-
vantaged farmers. 
The share of the costs of the investment approach 
relative to total project costs is comparable when 
subsidies are obtained by older farmers in non-LFAs 
(11.98%), when the loan is repaid in three years 
(12.34%) and when the lease payback period is three 
years, too (11.31%). In this case, the decision on the 
funding method based on the costs of the total value of 
the project criterion is not clear. Otherwise, young 
farmers in LFAs or non-LFAs, or older farmers in 
LFAs, would rather choose three-year bank loans or 
leases with a three-year payback period than subsidies. 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of the article was to simulate an investment 
project’s funding options to compare funding by 
subsidies from the RDP measure I.1.1.1 Modernisa-
tion of the farms to bank loans or leases. The results 
clearly point to the fact that the subsidy funding option 
is not without costs and that the actual amount of 
available finance is significantly lower. Contrary to 
expectations, the agricultural holding is somehow 
punished for receiving a higher percentage of subsidy 
in the form of higher costs related to the administra-
tion of the financial support. In specific cases, the 
bank loan or lease also had a lower share of costs 
relative to total project costs. It can be concluded that 
subsidies are not always the best fixed asset funding 
option and that agricultural holdings should always 
calculate all opportunity costs before the final decision 
is made. 
The analysis does not take into account exception-
al events such as additional costs due to a project 
delay, changes in the project and deficiencies in 
monitoring or administration, which would result in 
a reduction in subsidies. The challenge for further 
research is to verify the simulations empirically, i.e. to 
calculate the real percentage share of the amount of 
subsidies relative to total costs related to the subsidy 
or the total value of a project on the sample of agricul-
tural holdings in order to assess the real economic 
costs of the subsidised projects. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 Form for the simulation of the subsidy’s effect 
  Basic data about the project       
 Project price (mil.) Type of subsidy Amount of subsidy From the EU From the CR 
 2 700 4 1080 810 270 
    1 – Young farmer in LFA       
    2 – Other farmer in LFA       
    3 – Young farmer out of LFA       
    4 – Other farmer out of LFA       
            
  Timeline of the project       
Year –1 Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 ………………. n 
Preparation Investment. building. completing Start of usage Usage of the investment 
            
  Year of usage of the investment       
  10         
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  Write-offs         
  Entrance value 1 620       
  Write-off category 3 Years of write-off 10   
  Write-off rate: 1 year 5.5 Other years 10.5   
  Discount rate 2.09 %       
  Income tax rate 19 %       
            
  Opportunity costs          
    Write-offs Lost tax lowering Lost tax lowering after discount
  1st year 59.40 11.29 11.05 
  Other years 1020.60 193.91 154.35 
  Sum 1080.00 205.20 165.40 
            
  Pre-funding         
  Subsidy re-payment beginning of the year 1       
            
  All project pre-funded 1080       
  Pre-funding of 1/2 540 Beginning of the year 0   
  Pre-funding of 2/2 540 1/2 of the year 0     
            
  Loan         
  Interest rate 4.84 %   Interests Tax save 
  Borrowed amount 1080 for 360 days 52.29 9.93 
    or       
    540 for 360 days 26.14   
    540 for 180 days 13.07   
        39.22 7.45 
  
Net costs of the loan 
(interests – tax save) 
42.35       
  or       
  31.76       
            
  Administrative costs         
      Adjusted costs     
  Application submission 15.00 15.63     
  Tender administration 70.00 72.96     
  Project monitoring 16.00 16.17     
  Project finalizing 11.00 11.00     
      115.76     
            
  Summary of the project       
  Total costs of the project 2 700     
  Amount of subsidy   1080     
  Years of write-off   10     
  Lost tax lowering after discount 165.40     
  Net costs of the loan   42.35 31,76   
  Administrative costs   115.76     
  Additional costs of the subsidy 323.52 312.93   
  Share of the aditional costs on the total project costs 11.98 % 11.59 %   
  Adjusted amount of subsidy 756.48 767.07   
  Share of the additional costs on the amount of subsidy 29.96 % 28.97 %   
Auxiliary table   
M. Pechrová – Funding agricultural holdings’ investment projects: Focus on subsidies 
 
 
237
Write-off category Write-off rate 
 1st year other years 
1 – 3 years 20 40 
2 – 5 years 11 22.25 
3 – 10 years 5.5 10.5 
4 – 20 years 2.15 5.15 
5 – 30 years 1.4 3.4 
6 – 50 years 1.02 2.02 
  
